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ABSTRACT
This paper reformulates classical questions regarding the plans and
strategies of Polish migrants in the UK – such as decisions to leave
or remain in the host country, or be ‘deliberately indeterminate’
about future plans – from a sociologically situated ‘rights-based’
perspective. This approach considers migrants’ attitudes towards
specific ‘civic integration’ measures in a medium-term time frame, as
well as in the new context created by the UK’s vote to leave the EU.
Based on the quantitative analysis of original survey data, we
investigate the factors behind Polish migrants’ migration strategies,
and we argue that basic socio-economic and demographic factors
are inadequate, on their own terms, to explain future migration and
civic integration plans. Instead, we find that aspects such as interest
in and awareness of one’s rights, as well as anxieties about the
ability to maintain one’s rights in the future are stronger determinants.
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Introduction
The UK’s decision to leave the EU – or ‘Brexit’, as it became colloquially known – raises
various theoretical and empirical questions for migration scholars studying what less than
a decade ago was still an emerging ‘new European migration system’ (Favell 2008), in
which the ‘free movement of people’ served as the main driving force behind ‘horizontal
Europeanisation’ (Mau and Verwiebe 2014). In the UK, the largest single national group
among the new arrivals were Polish citizens (Burrell 2009; White 2011), and early research
into this migratory phenomenon has identified transience, fluidity and contingency as some
of its main characteristics (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007). At the same time, sus-
tained research on Polish migrants has increasingly emphasised emergent desires of achiev-
ing a ‘normal’ life, alongside strengthening reasons for and signs of more permanent
settlement (Burrell 2009). The UK’s departure from the EU and the inevitable change in
the legal status of resident Polish nationals – whatever particular shape that will take –
will unavoidably impact on the two contrasting trends of ‘transience’ and ‘settlement’.
In this paper, we provide an early assessment of how ‘Brexit’ affects Polish migrants in
the UK, focusing specifically on the question of migration plans and strategies, which has
been a core theme in the research literature from the very early post-Accession studies to
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the present (Burrell 2010; Drinkwater and Garapich 2015; Eade, Drinkwater, and Gara-
pich 2007). As Burrell (2010, 299) noted, Polish migrants have long constituted ‘a
diverse, not entirely predictable, population, all existing within the same economic frame-
work but formulating different strategies of migration and return’ which will most likely
‘change over time’. The Brexit vote has introduced an additional element of uncertainty to
the complexity of Polish migrants’ active and passive plans and strategies, and the aim of
this paper is primarily to further explore such strategies in the context of Brexit. To this
end, we present results from a quantitative analysis of data obtained from a purposefully
designed and ‘targeted’ online survey carried out in the months leading up to the EU
Referendum. The survey had the broader goal of assessing different EUmigrants’ opinions
on the Referendum, their future plans and coping strategies in the event of a potential
Brexit vote, as well as their attitudes towards British citizenship. The focus on the latter
was driven by the already noticeable surge in applications for British citizenship by EU
nationals, stirred by fears regarding the UK’s uncertain future EU membership
(McGhee and Piętka-Nykaza 2016; Ryan 2015). In this paper, we focus on a sample of
894 Polish respondents. This allows us to draw closer parallels with the existing literature,
and provides more reliable grounds for extrapolation to a Polish migrant community
which is currently the largest non-British national group in the UK, estimated at
916,000 individuals, and making up 29% of all EU nationals living in the country (ONS
2016).
This paper, therefore, makes a contribution to the literature on migrants’ intentions and
strategies, while breaking new ground in our understanding of the effects of Brexit as per-
ceived by the UK’s Polish migrant community. First, we examine more closely the litera-
ture on migration intentions, with a particular focus on the tendency to keep one’s plans
deliberately indeterminate, which has been repeatedly highlighted as one of the most dis-
tinguishing characteristics of mobility throughout the first decade of post-Enlargement
Polish migration (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007; McGhee, Travena, and Heath
2015). We then discuss our data and methods before moving on to our analysis and find-
ings, and contextualising the latter in the existing scholarship.
Migration strategies and the habitus of ‘indeterminacy’
Return, settlement and ‘deliberate indeterminacy’
A key theme in the literature on post-Accession migration to the UK is concerned with the
new migrants’ intended length of stay and their plans with regard to either returning to
their ‘home’ country or settlement in the country of destination (Burrell 2010). Notwith-
standing this interest, the study of return migration has remained somewhat ‘problematic’
(Parutis 2014, 159). The discrepancy between planned and actual return has become a
truism in migration research, and it is also true of Polish migrants (Anwar 1979; Ryan
2015). Nevertheless, qualitative studies were successful in identifying some of the main
factors which have an influence on migrants’ strategies. The role of familial obligations
with regard to children, grand-children, elderly parents and other relatives in the host
and home countries (McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2013; White 2011; White and Ryan
2008), of childbearing decisions (Janta 2013), the length of stay in the destination
country (Ryan 2015) and the level of social integration and transnationalism (de Haas
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and Fokkema 2011) in particular have been shown to influence migrants’ decisions to
settle or re-migrate.
At the same time, the increasing ease of travel and communication, complemented in
Europe by the policy regime of free movement and equal treatment for EU citizens, allows
for more opportunities not only for travelling but also for ‘living transnationally’, and this
necessarily engenders novel mobility habita (Heath, McGhee, and Trevena 2011; Levitt
and Schiller 2004; Ryan 2011). One such ‘mobility habitus’ highlighted in the literature
on post-Enlargement Polish migration to the UK was the ‘intentional unpredictability’
of many recent migrants with regard to their future plans, their tendency to ‘keep their
options deliberately open’ (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007, 11). Alternatively refer-
ring to it as ‘intentional unpredictability’, ‘liquid migration’, ‘lasting temporariness’ or
‘deliberate indeterminacy’, authors describing this disposition were highlighting two puta-
tive empirical characteristics of this mobility – its ‘temporary’ and ‘unplanned’ character –
with a stronger emphasis on one or the other (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007;
McGhee, Travena, and Heath 2015; Snel, Faber, and Engbersen 2015).
In this paper, we give preference to the term ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ for several
reasons. Firstly, the more commonly used notion of ‘intentional unpredictability’ seems
to reflect, semantically at least, the perspective of a politics of measurement – by empha-
sising the difficulty to predict migratory movements – rather than that of the migrants
themselves. Secondly, we wished to de-emphasise ‘temporariness’ and ‘fluidity’; Polish
migrants, qua EU citizens, may remain undetermined about plans for the future
without necessarily becoming ‘temporary’ residents, given that they automatically
acquire permanent resident status after five years of exercising free movement rights.
Also, ‘indeterminacy’ can arguably be construed as supportive of the oft-described quest
for a ‘normal life’ among those who have been resident for longer and have begun estab-
lishing families, as evading the necessity to formulate clear return or settlement plans can
enhance the sense of ‘normalcy’ by essentially normalising transnational forms of belong-
ing and activity across the lifecourse (Galasińska and Kozłowska 2009; Lopez Rodriguez
2010; McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2012; Morokvasic 2004).
Operationalising indeterminacy
A few studies have recently attempted to disentangle the relationships between migration
strategies and migrants’ indeterminacy habitus based on primary quantitative data. Snel,
Faber, and Engbersen (2015), for instance, have examined the factors determining the self-
declared planned length of stay of three EU national groups (Polish, Romanian and Bul-
garian) in the Netherlands using survey data (N = 654). The authors treat ‘do not know’
answers in respect to planned length of stay as a manifestation of ‘intentional unpredict-
ability’. Their findings show that involvement in transnational activities significantly
reduced the chances of migrants wanting to settle permanently, while age and the level
of socio-cultural integration significantly increased their intention to settle. The influence
of gender, education and socio-economic status produced mixed results, while labour
market participation seemed not to have any influence on migrants’ plans.
Drinkwater and Garapich (2015) adopt a similar study design to investigate the
migration strategies of Poles in the UK (N = 700). Their specific aim was to develop a
new typology of Polish migrants in light of their planned stay in the UK, factoring in
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changes in their intentions over time. Similar to Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015), the
authors also treated those who did not know for how long they were planning to stay,
as exponents of the habitus of deliberate indeterminacy. Overall, of the respondents in
their sample, 11% intended to stay in the UK permanently upon arrival, and 18% felt
the same at the time of the interview, while 32% and 44% were indeterminate at the
time of arrival and at the time of the interview, respectively. Their analysis shows that
the length of stay in the UK determines whether migrants change their intentions.
These two studies are significant in that they attempt to operationalise the concept of
deliberate indeterminacy, and examine it in relation to other strategies and changes in
plans over time. However, they remain constrained by self-declared migration intentions
at a specific point in time, and the different contributions of each paper are yet to be inte-
grated within a unifying framework. As a consequence, our knowledge of how migration
plans change over time and what factors determine this change remains to be synthesised
with the rather inconclusive findings regarding the determinants of particular plans and
strategies at given points in time. Furthermore, there is a lack of consideration in the
broader literature of the relationship between migrants’ self-declared preferences and the
constellation of rights and options available to them. At the same time, we now must con-
sider ‘Brexit’ as a new factor which potentially affects migrants’ plans and strategies. Based
on sporadic evidence in this respect in the recent literature, we can assume that the outcome
of the referendum on EU membership is likely to disrupt Polish migrants’ reported habitus
of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ (McGhee and Piętka-Nykaza 2016; Ryan 2015).
A rights-based approach to migration strategies
In response to the gaps in current knowledge identified in the literature review, our aim in
this paper is to reframe questions regarding migration strategies and their determinants
within a sociologically situated civic-rights-based approach, while also addressing the
latest political development that potentially affects the lives and future plans of Polish
migrants in the UK. Instead of focusing purely on migrants’ self-declared plans and strat-
egies, we place these strategies in relation to specific actions toward ‘civic integration’
(such as applying for British citizenship or a document certifying permanent residence),
while leaving open the possibilities for interpretation of the motivations behind such
actions. We acknowledge, accordingly, that in the case of EU migrants ‘civic integration’
must not necessarily equate ‘settlement’, just as ‘indeterminacy’ does not necessarily reflect
‘temporariness’. Under the conditions of EU citizenship, the difference between opting for
a permanent residence certificate and espousing a habitus of ‘indeterminacy’ may come
down to specific personal circumstances or individual dispositions such as one’s subjective
sense of insecurity and confidence in relying on ‘supranationally derived’ rights (Wiener
2013). We therefore consider both the constellation of civic rights legally enjoyed by Polish
EU nationals in the UK, and their perceptions of them.
In terms of legal rights and civic integration options, EU citizens find themselves in an
ambivalent position. On the one hand, the requirement to ‘integrate civically’ – as ‘civic inte-
gration’ is commonly defined in the literature (Goodman 2012, 659; Joppke 2007; Mouritsen
2013) – does not obtain in respect to securing a permanent residence certificate, and EU
nationals cannot be charged more than what British nationals would be for comparable
identity documents. As noted earlier, EU migrants acquire permanent residence status
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automatically after five years of qualified residence, and obtaining a document certifying this
does not provide any additional benefits, although it can help prove one’s status in certain
circumstances.1 As such, it cannot be readily interpreted as ‘settlement’, as it may merely
reflect a desire to secure tangible proof of supranational rights. On the other hand, as of
November 2015, holding a permanent residence certificate has been a requirement before
applying for British citizenship,2 and EU citizens face similar ‘civic integration’ and financial
requirements to Third Country Nationals when applying for naturalisation.
Within this broad legal-normative framework, Polish migrants can make ‘civic inte-
gration’ decisions based on their subjective assessment of the rights they possess, and
the EU referendum provides an additional context for such decision-making by potentially
increasing the sense of uncertainty regarding supranationally derived rights. Taking into
consideration the above, our aim here is therefore to find out what factors contribute
towards determining the migration and ‘civic integration’ strategies of Polish migrants
in the UK (1) over a normatively relevant medium-term time frame and (2) under the con-
ditions created by the UK’s vote to leave the EU. Our approach, therefore, acknowledges
that long-term plans are changeable and hard to determine (Burrell 2010; Parutis 2014),
and also that ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘civic integration’ can both be manifestations of different
forms of transnational living (McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2012; Morokvasic 2004; Ryan
2011; White and Ryan 2008).
Data and methods
Study design and data structure
We analyse data originating from a purposefully designed ‘targeted’ online survey (Polish-
only sampleN = 894). The purpose of the survey was to assess the attitudes of EUmigrants
towards the Referendum on EU membership, its effect on their lives and their strategies in
case of a vote for Brexit, and thus contribute to the public debate on the issue. The online
survey data collection method was chosen with the aim to obtain a geographically dis-
persed large sample under strict time constraints (see Sue and Ritter 2012, 10–11). In
order to achieve greater representativeness among the respondents, the survey was trans-
lated into Polish. Data collection was undertaken in the four months leading up to the EU
Referendum; the questionnaire was launched on 11March 2016 and closed at midnight on
23 June 2016 (i.e. the date of the EU Referendum). The main body of the questionnaire
contained a total of 194 items, and it took respondents 25 minutes on average to complete
(min = 6, max = 111, standard deviation = 13.9).
To avoid the respondent and coverage biases often considered as ‘innate’ to online
surveys (Couper 2000; Sue and Ritter 2012), we used an active data collection method,
directly targeting members of Polish online communities and readers of UK-based
Polish-language online media portals. The social networking site Facebook served as
the largest participant recruitment platform, where we advertised the survey in 21
Polish-language ‘groups’. Two large UK-based Polish online newspapers have also
helped to distribute the survey through their websites and official Facebook pages. Such
strategies of ‘appropriate targeting’ proved particularly successful in research with hard-
to-reach populations, and were generally recommended as good practice for online data
collection (Miller and Sønderlund 2010; Temple and Brown 2011). Furthermore, recent
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migration research has shown that migrants are increasingly less affected by ‘coverage
bias’, as access to the internet is broadening while their involvement with the so-called
online migration industry is extensive (Dekker and Engbersen 2014; Moreh 2014).
In order to assess the representativeness of our collected data, Table 1 compares the
personal characteristics of our sample with those of the 2015–2016 Annual Population
Survey (APS), which is itself based on the Labour Force Survey, and is the main source
of information regarding the number and attributes of migrants in the UK.
As detailed in Table 1, females are clearly overrepresented in our sample (66%) com-
pared to the APS, as are migrants in the 40–49 age group, those who had been living in
Table 1. Personal characteristics of the survey sample and comparison with the APS.
EU-Ref survey APS 2015–2016
N % N %
Sample Polish, over 16yoa 894 100 2453 100
Sex Female 583 66% 1324 54%
Age Mean (min–max; SD) 38
(19–65; 9)
35
(16–93; 10.4)
Age (groups) Under 30 145 16% 667 27%
30–39 402 45% 1182 48%
40–49 234 26% 379 16%
50 and over 106 12% 225 9%
Years in UK Mean (min–max; SD) 7y2m
(1m–18y3m; 3y4m)
8.78
(0–71; 5.626)
Years in UK (groups) Less than 5 267 30% 464 19%
5–10 417 47% 1276 52%
More than 10 203 23% 701 29%
UK Country England 715 80% 2014 82%
Wales 36 4% 139 6%
Scotland 122 14% 252 10%
Northern Ireland 18 2% 48 2%
Relationship status Married or in civil partnership 450 52% 1226 50%
Not married (cohabiting) 140 16% 504 21%
Not married 276 32% 723 30%
Economic activity status Employed (full-time) 512 61% 1366 56%
Employed (part-time) 139 17% 364 15%
Self-employed 79 9% 269 11%
Inactive and unemployed 110 13% 454 19%
Socio-economic status (NS_SEC) I: Higher managerial, administrative
and professional
48 8% 74 3%
II: Lower managerial, administrative
and professional occupations
59 10% 205 9%
III: Intermediate occupations 39 6% 135 6%
IV: Small employers and own
account workers
56 9% 264 12%
V&VI: Lower supervisory, technical,
and semi-routine occupations
205 34% 768 35%
VII: Routine occupations 204 33% 719 33%
Highest educational qualification Master’s degree or above 141 16% 195 8%
Undergraduate/Bachelor’s degree 107 12% 329 13%
College/post-secondary
qualification
129 14% 221 9%
Secondary qualification 353 40% 265 11%
Vocational/professional
qualification
130 15% 343 14%
Other qualification 5 1% 825 34%
No qualifications – – 229 9%
Missing 29 3% 46 2%
aFor reasons of commensurability, only respondents of Polish nationality [NTNLTY12] over the age of 16 were included in
the APS comparison sample.
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the UK for less than 5 years, and those with secondary and postgraduate educational qua-
lifications. However, in respect to educational qualifications and length of residence in the
UK the APS itself is unrepresentative of the Polish migrant population, often failing to
record foreign qualifications adequately and not accounting for migrants with less than
one year of residence.
In respect to the core personal and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents in
our sample, we can further see that the average age is 38, and the average time spent in the
UK is 7 years and 2 months, with 47% of our participants having been in the UK for 5–10
years. Those living in England constitute 80% of the sample, with a very broad distribution
by counties and those in London making up less than 6.5% of the entire sample (not dis-
played in Table 1). About 40% had a secondary educational degree and 42% some post-
secondary degree; 61% were employed full-time, 17% part-time, 9% were self-employed,
and 13% were inactive; of those in employment, 18% worked in professional occupations
in the highest two groups of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification, 34% in
technical and semi-routine occupations, and 33% in routine occupations reflecting lower
socio-economic status. As seen in Table 1, the major differences compared to the APS
sample are in respect to those inactive (19% in the APS), presumably due to the higher
proportion of elderly respondents, and those in higher managerial, administrative and
professional occupations (8% in our sample compared to 3% in the APS), which parallels
the already mentioned difference in the share of those with postgraduate qualifications.
Methods
We undertake a combination of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses on the
survey data described above, with the aim to identify and explain the factors which poten-
tially determine the migration and civic integration plans of Polish migrants in the
medium-term and as a short-term reaction to the Brexit vote.
We first examine bivariate associations between migrants’ plans for the next five years
and various demographic, socio-economic, interpersonal, migration- and civic-status-
related, and attitudinal variables. Some relevant results of this analysis are included in
Table A1 in the Appendix. This preliminary analysis enabled us to identify the potentially
most relevant predictor variables and the internal structure of associations. Based on this,
we undertake multinomial logistic regression analyses on two polytomous variables
describing our participants’ five-year plans and planned actions in case of a Brexit
outcome. This analysis examines the factors determining plans not in a time frame con-
fined to five years, but as an indication of how Polish migrants confront their ‘immediate
context of action’ (Stones 2005, 166). The statistical analysis was performed using the IBM
SPSS 23 software package.
Decisions regarding the variables to be included and the comparative structure of the
regression model were made on the basis of both theoretical and data-driven consider-
ations. Thus, some basic demographic and socio-economic variables were included even
though they did not significantly correlate with our dependent variable or contributed
to the model, yet they needed to be accounted for in relation to other variables (e.g.
gender, due to the overrepresentation of women in our data). Some variables were
excluded or recoded due to low counts in certain categories, and – where it also aided
explanation – initial variables were recoded based on the internal structure of the adjusted
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2115
standardised residuals in their association with the dependent variable (see Table A1 in the
Appendix). For our theoretical aims, since we were mostly interested in understanding
how migrants formulate their actions in respect to their current status and their options
within a rights-based framework, we chose as the reference category of our dependent
variable the one which can be most closely associated with the habitus of ‘indeterminacy’,
as we detail in the following section describing the structure of our measurement variables.
Measurement variables
The two main survey questions that organise our analysis relate to the respondents’ future
plans in respect to migration and civic integration (1) in a five-year time frame (five-year
plan) and (2) in the more immediate context of a Leave vote in the EU Referendum (Brexit
action). The two questions shared six similar response options, which in our analyses are
coded to reflect four broader options for future action: (1) to leave the UK (re-migrate to a
third country or return to Poland), (2) to remain in the UK and apply for a permanent
residence certificate (PRC), (3) apply for British citizenship or (4) remain in the UK
without any concrete plan/action (for a detailed list of the survey questions and derived
variables, see Appendix Table A2).
Confining the approach taken by Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015) and Drinkwater
and Garapich (2015) to a more time-restricted and rights-based framework, we consider
those who choose to ‘remain in the UK without any concrete plan’ to represent the habitus
of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’. The focus of this paper required that those in the sample
who already hold a PRC be distinguished from those who do not, given that their ‘inde-
terminacy’ has a different interpretation in respect to civic integration options. To high-
light this latter case, a new category called ‘No plan/action (with PRC)’ was created and
is presented in Figure 1, but was excluded from all bivariate and multivariate analyses,
reducing the valid sample size by 61.
Figure 1. Polish migrants’ future plans in a 5-year time frame and in case of Brexit.
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The two variables ‘five-year plan’ and ‘Brexit action’ will serve as our dependent vari-
ables. The independent predictor variables are a combination of core socio-demographic
characteristics that have been singled out in the literature as influencing some aspects of
migrant behaviour related to our focus in this paper, and other characteristics concerning
family relationships, perceptions on civic rights and opinions related to the context of
Brexit that were specific to our survey. Some of the main socio-demographic character-
istics were already presented in Table 1, and other survey-specific variables not presented
there due to a lack of comparability with the APS are: children (in the UK), partner’s econ-
omic activity (if not single); the language spoken in a workplace environment (English or
other); whether the respondent is planning to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in
the future’, and whether they were eligible to do so at the time of the survey or within one
year; whether they have close relatives who are eligible for a PRC within one year; whether
they feel ‘insecure’ about the rights they currently hold as EU citizens; whether they feel
‘anxious’ about the possibility of Brexit; and their preference for the outcome of the EU
Referendum.
These above variables were all considered in the bivariate analysis (see Table A1), but
some were changed for the multivariate analyses. The variables relating to relationship
status and children were excluded due to a lack of statistically significant influence;
instead, the category of ‘single’was included within the variable coding the ‘partner’s econ-
omic activity’, while a dichotomous variable describing having ‘close relatives in the UK’
was created to include those who were not single and/or had children and/or parents in the
UK. Accounting for the partner’s economic activity status was deemed important due to
the overrepresentation of women in the sample and the significant correlation between
gender and economic activity (coded as in Table 1, χ2 = 106.22 (3, N = 838), p = 0.000;
Cramer’s V = .356; 3.8% of the men in the sample were ‘inactive’, compared to 18% of
the women). By controlling for the partner’s economic status, we hoped to further
reduce any bias caused by the underrepresentation of men in our sample.
Considering intentions to naturalise as a British citizen ‘at any time in the future’
enables us to grasp the relationship between subjective intentions and the rights-based fra-
mework we have introduced. It can indicate, for instance, what migrants’ general disposi-
tion is towards acquiring British citizenship, and whether their attitudes translate into
concrete actions in a five-year time frame or as a reaction to the vote for Brexit.
The variable measuring self-reported eligibility for British citizenship not only indicates
the respondents’ status, but also awareness of the legal requirements for naturalisation, by
distinguishing the answer option ‘Do not know (the eligibility requirements).’
The two variables referring to feelings of ‘insecurity’ and ‘anxiety’ are meant to assess the
influence of the respondents’ state of mind on their planned actions. ‘Brexit anxiety’ was
derived from two more general five-level Likert items regarding the perceived likelihood
of a Brexit vote, and whether it would have a negative effect. ‘Rights insecurity’ derives
from two Likert-type scalesmeasuring the perceived likelihood that certain concrete entitle-
ments held as EU citizens would become limited in the future, and whether losing that par-
ticular entitlement would have a negative effect; each scale consisted of nine similar items
listing concrete social, work-related and mobility rights. Therefore, while ‘Brexit anxiety’
denotes a more general unease in respect to the EU referendum, ‘rights uncertainty’ has a
more specific character, and it estimates whether the rights granted by EU citizenship are
deemed to be in jeopardy regardless of the outcome of the Referendum.
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Finally, the variable referring to the preferred outcome for the EU Referendum checks
the influence of outcome favourability on migration strategies. A detailed description of
the original survey questions and the ways in which our variables were derived is presented
in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Analysis and findings
We first examine the distribution of responses to the two main survey questions examin-
ing migration plans in a five-year medium-term time frame and in case of Brexit. As
shown in Figure 1, in the next five years 40% of the respondents were planning to
apply for a PRC, 32% for citizenship, 5% were planning to return to Poland while
merely 1% wished to move to a third country, and 22% were ‘indeterminate’, choosing
to remain in the UK without any concrete plan. However, 7% were ‘indeterminate’
while already holding a PRC, and only 15% chose to remain in the UK relying solely
on their EU free movement rights.3
We can also see that in the case of Brexit a much higher proportion of the respondents
would apply for permanent residence (51%), while in the share of those who are planning
to naturalise we observe a decrease of a comparable magnitude (down to 21%). This
change, however, is primarily attributable to those who would not qualify for naturalis-
ation immediately after Brexit, and would therefore apply for PRC instead, which is never-
theless a required step before a potential future application for British citizenship
[reference withheld]. The number of those planning to stay in the UK without taking
any further action also decreases to 11%, while more respondents would choose to
migrate to a third country (6%). There is only a negligible difference in the percentage
of those who would return to Poland. In broad terms, we find that in case of a vote for
Brexit 10% of the Poles in the UK would leave the country (compared to 6% otherwise),
an overwhelming majority (72%) wished to remain and formalise their residence through
civic integration measures regardless of the referendum result, and Brexit does seem to
somewhat reduce the level of ‘indeterminacy’, giving support to a hypothesis that Brexit
pushes Polish migrants towards having to formulate more concrete plans for the future.
The bivariate analysis examining the association between different variables and five-
year plans discloses that age, education, socio-economic status, the language spoken in
a workplace environment, wanting to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the
future’ and eligibility to do so within one year, having close relatives eligible for PRC,
and the respondent’s preference as to the outcome of the EU Referendum are all signifi-
cantly correlated (at the p < .05 level) with stated five-year plans (Table A1 in the Appen-
dix, which also includes descriptive statistics for the discussed variables). On the other
hand, key socio-demographic and migration-related variables such as sex, economic
activity, time spent in the UK, relationship status or having children do not seem to be
on their own significantly related to migration plans. Apart from having general future
naturalisation intentions, however, the strength of the significant associations is small
(Cramer’s V statistic is below .2 in all cases) and the examined factors each explain less
than 2% of the variance in five-year plans (based on the Goodman and Kruskal τ test).
As we might expect, having plans to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the
future’ is very strongly associated with medium-term plans (Cramer’s V = .542, p
= .000) – which includes plans to apply for citizenship in the next five years – and explains
2118 D. MCGHEE ET AL.
11% of the variance in migration strategies (Goodman and Kruskal τ = .109, p = .000).
From the distribution of adjusted standardised residuals, we also find that those open
to naturalisation in general were significantly more likely than expected to be planning
to apply for British citizenship in the next five years (z = 13.8), and significantly less
likely to consider leaving the UK, applying for PRC only, or taking no action (z =−6.6,
−3.4 and −9, respectively).
Some other highly significant associations worth highlighting here are: speaking
English in a workplace environment, which significantly increases the likelihood of natu-
ralisation planning (z = 4.2) and decreases ‘indeterminacy’ (z =−4.7); perceived eligibility
to apply for British citizenship within one year has a similar effect, with those eligible sig-
nificantly more likely to be planning naturalisation within the next five years (z = 5.2) –
notably, however, not being eligible does not have a significant effect in the opposite direc-
tion, but ‘not knowing the requirements’ for naturalisation does (z =−4.6) and it also sig-
nificantly increases the likelihood of having no concrete plans (z = 3.6); the same pattern of
effects applies in respect to having close relatives who are eligible to apply for PRC, which
increases the likelihood of naturalisation plans (z = 3) and decreases both intentions to
leave (z =−3.1) and of being ‘indeterminate’ (z =−3) – again, not knowing the require-
ments for permanent residence increases the likelihood of remaining in the UK without
any concrete plans (z = 4.3) (for other results see Table A1, in the Appendix).
To account for the effect of all these variables, however, we also examine their interaction
in a logistic regression model. Table 2 reports results from two separately run models, one
only accounting for six core socio-demographic variables, namely sex, age, education,
employment status, time spent in the UK and having close relatives in the UK (Model I,
N = 746, Nagelkerke R2 = .105), and one also including the survey-specific variables
(Model II,N = 683, Nagelkerke R2 = .473). The purpose of Model I is primarily to highlight
the change in some of the effects following the inclusion of more specific variables.
As we find, gender has a very marginal role in indicating migration plans, while the
effect of age and education proved more significant. Compared to those under 30,
migrants aged 40 and over are twice to three times as likely to be planning civic integration
(PRC or citizenship) as opposed to not having concrete plans, and less likely to leave the
UK. Those in their thirties are also twice as likely as those in the younger age group to be
planning permanent residence or citizenship (in Model II). Those whose highest achieved
educational qualification is at the secondary school level have proven significantly less
likely to be planning either to leave or to become British citizens than those holding
post-secondary educational qualifications. Highly qualified individuals are four times as
likely as those educated at the secondary level to be planning to leave the UK in the
next five years, while at the same time twice as likely to apply for citizenship as those
with secondary education, and 2.7 times as likely as those with vocational qualifications.
Employment status, the length of time spent in the UK and having close relatives in the
UK present more complex effects. For instance, employment status is not at all significant
when accounting only for core socio-demographic characteristics (Model I), but it gains
significance when also holding constant other attitudinal and interpersonal variables
(Model II). Interestingly – and somewhat counterintuitively – having any kind of employ-
ment (compared to being economically inactive) appears to very significantly reduce the
odds of planning citizenship as opposed to not having concrete plans. Apparently, those
economically inactive are six to twelve times more likely to be planning to apply for
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citizenship than those in any form of employment, and also three times more likely to
apply for PRC than those employed part-time. However, these effects gain significance
only when controlling for the language spoken at the workplace. As we can see from
Table 2, being exposed to English language in a workplace environment very significantly
increases the odds of planning to apply for citizenship as opposed to having no concrete
plans (those speaking English at work are in fact seven times more likely to have such
plans). What this shows is that it is not the fact of being in employment per se, but
rather having a job in which they do not speak English which significantly decreases
the likelihood of civic integration plans.
The length of time spent in the UK, on the other hand, correlates with one’s eligibility
for civic integration, and we can see how it gains statistical significance when controlling
for the latter in Model II. Interestingly, those who had been in the UK for more than 10
years are significantly (and over three times more likely) to plan leaving compared to being
undetermined than those with shorter residence, but only when knowledge about one’s
civic status is also considered; simultaneously, those who are aware that they are not eli-
gible for British citizenship within one year are more likely to have plans to leave the UK
within five years than those who are either eligible or who do not know whether they
qualify for naturalisation or not. At the same time, being unaware of one’s eligibility
Table 2. Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis on 5-year plans (odds ratios).
Leave the UK PRC Citizenship
I II I II I II
Female 0.523+ 0.745 0.939 0.804 0.849 0.594+
Age 40 and over 0.46 0.238** 2.021* 2.848*** 1.568 2.209*
Age 30–39 1.136 0.759 1.541 1.984* 1.576 1.935*
Qualification: vocational 0.804 0.940 0.919 0.945 0.363** 0.367**
Qualification: secondary 0.276** 0.247*** 0.716 0.752 0.416*** 0.520*
Employed full-time 1.264 0.641 1.363 0.759 1.207 0.167**
Employed part-time 1.001 0.484 0.805 0.361* 1.11 0.123***
Self-employed 2.022 0.735 1.794 0.788 0.925 0.087***
Less than 5 years in UK 0.79 0.275* 1.351 1.388 0.72 0.749
5–10 years in UK 0.626 0.311** 1.117 1.074 0.692 0.715
Has close relatives in UK 0.52 1.955 1.387 1.325 1.381 1.123
Partner: employed 0.284* 0.461* 0.654
Partner: inactive 0.254+ 0.309* 0.310*
Speaks English at work 2.011 1.604+ 6.797***
Plans naturalisation 0.338** 2.987*** 105.786***
Eligible for citizenship 0.254* 0.670 0.858
Does not know if eligible for citizenship 0.332* 0.926 0.435*
Has close relatives eligible for PRC 1.153 3.049*** 2.585***
Feels insecure about rights 0.991 1.268 2.015**
Feels anxious about Brexit 1.029 1.162 1.280
Prefers UK to leave or only conditionally stay in the EU 2.156* 1.786** 1.710*
Nagelkerke R2 .105 .473
N 746 683
Notes: The dependent reference category is ‘No plan/action.’ The independent reference categories are: male; Under 30;
post-secondary education; inactive; more than 10 years in UK; does not have close relatives in the UK; single; does not
speak English at work; does not plan to apply for British citizenship anytime in the future; is not eligible for citizenship
now or within one year; does not have close relatives who are eligible for PRC; does not feel insecure about her rights;
does not feel ‘anxious’ about Brexit; prefers the UK to remain in the EU.
Model I χ2 (33) = 74.919, p < .001; Model II χ2 (63) = 383.348, p < .001. Model II was rescaled for underdispersion based on
the deviance statistic (φ = 0.63).
+p < .1.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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significantly increases the odds of ‘indeterminacy’ as opposed to having plans of natural-
isation for the next five years, compared to knowing that one is not eligible (Exp(B) = .435);
put differently, those aware of their short-term ineligibility are 2.3 times more likely to still
intend to apply for citizenship within a 5-year time frame than those who had not shown
interest in acquiring this knowledge about the requirements for naturalisation. In conjunc-
tion with the finding that awareness of having close family members who are eligible for
PRC makes one three times more likely to be planning PRC oneself, and 2.6 times more
likely to be planning naturalisation (while having close relatives in the UK, in itself, is not
significant, see Table 2), the conclusion to be drawn is that prior interest in and awareness
of one’s rights and those of other close family members, are the factors that more strongly
determine civic integration decisions, rather than simply the length of residence in the UK.
The strong statistical significance of having general future naturalisation intentions in
determining medium-term plans is not the least surprising, yet the odds ratios that it gen-
erates are noteworthy; as we can see in Table 2, planning to apply for British citizenship ‘at
any time in the future’ understandably decreases the odds of planning to leave the UK in
the next five years as opposed to planning to remain without any concrete plans of civic
integration in the medium-term, while increasing the odds of applying for permanent resi-
dence. We can also see that those with a general intention to naturalise are 106 times more
likely to apply for British citizenship in the next five years rather than in the more distant
future.4 This finding may have considerable policy implications, especially since in our
overall sample 66% of the Polish respondents have expressed an intention to apply for
British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’.
In respect to the remaining independent variables that we have not yet discussed, we
find that having a partner – who is either in employment or inactive – significantly
increases the odds of ‘indeterminacy’ compared to all other optional future plans
(although there is no statistically significant difference in respect to planning citizenship
when the partner is in employment). As mentioned in the previous section, the variable
regarding the partner’s economic status was mainly included as a control due to the over-
representation of women in the sample, who were themselves significantly overrepre-
sented among those in part-time employment and the economically inactive. By itself,
however, the effect of the partnership variable is hard to interpret, although it may
suggest that for those who have partners any decision regarding the future has to be
made in agreement, which makes the decision-making process more difficult.
As we may have expected, feeling ‘anxious’ about a possible ‘Brexit’ was not significant
in determining five-year plans ‘regardless of the EU referendum’, but feeling ‘insecure’
about the durability of currently enjoyed rights did make Polish migrants twice as likely
to be planning naturalisation than continuing to rely on EU citizenship entitlements.
Finally, respondents’ preference in respect to the outcome of the Referendum was signifi-
cant: those who preferred that the UK left the EU or remained a member only con-
ditionally have significantly higher odds of being among those with a concrete plan for
the future, be they intentions to leave or plans of civic integration.
We also ran the full model on another dependent variable referring to planned actions
in case of a Brexit vote. The results are shown in Table 3, and we will highlight here some
of the main differences compared to the results discussed above. Generally, the determi-
nants of planned actions in case of Brexit are more difficult to reduce to any socio-econ-
omic or demographic factors; while the independent variables selected for analysis
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explained 47.3% of the variance in ‘5-year plans’, they only explain 32.6% of the variance
in ‘Brexit actions’ (Nagelkerke R2). As we can see, age, education, partnership status, and
having close relatives eligible for PRC all lose significance in some aspects, while speaking
English in a workplace environment maintains its influence on naturalisation intentions.
Length of residence in the UK loses its significance in respect to plans to leave, but gains
significance in respect to permanent residence: those who had been in the UK for less than
5 years are 2.6 times more likely to apply for PRC rather than to take no action compared
to those who had lived in the UK for over 10 years.
General intent to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’ also loses its
significance in respect to plans to leave following Brexit, and the odds by which it deter-
mines plans to apply for citizenship in the ‘immediate context of action’ created by Brexit
is also reduced to a nevertheless still considerable level (Exp(B) = 43.248). The changes in
the explanatory power of eligibility for citizenship are, however, more interesting. While in
case of Brexit it no longer explains plans to leave, it gains significance in respect to
post-Brexit plans to naturalise. Following a Brexit vote, those eligible for British citizenship
are seven times more likely to apply for citizenship than not to take any action, compared
to those who are not eligible; furthermore, while unawareness of one’s eligibility acted to
reduce one’s likelihood to contemplate naturalisation as a 5-year plan, following Brexit
those not knowing whether they are eligible are 3.3 times as likely to want to apply for
Table 3. Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis on actions in case of Brexit (odds ratios).
Leave the UK PRC Citizenship
Female 0.520+ 0.734 0.681
Age 40 and over 0.778 1.864+ 2.586*
Age 30–39 0.562 1.441 2.112+
Qualification: vocational 0.949 1.630 0.765
Qualification: secondary 0.524* 1.035 0.723
Employed full-time 0.881 0.673 0.100**
Employed part-time 0.554 0.346* 0.050***
Self-employed 0.790 0.467 0.065**
Less than 5 years in UK 1.667 2.566* 1.692
5–10 year in UK 1.460 1.729+ 1.611
Has close relatives in UK 1.547 1.344 2.306
Partner: employed 0.621 1.034 1.227
Partner: inactive 0.356 0.701 0.704
Speaks English at work 0.961 1.405 6.594**
Plans naturalisation 1.071 2.538*** 43.248***
Eligible for citizenship 1.158 1.891+ 7.035***
Does not know if eligible for citizenship 1.049 1.571 3.291**
Has close relatives eligible for PRC 1.648 1.986* 1.016
Feels insecure about rights 1.450 1.157 1.362
Feels anxious about Brexit 3.137*** 2.452*** 2.477**
Prefers UK to leave or only conditionally stay in EU 1.187 1.596* 1.553+
Nagelkerke R2 .326
N 683
Notes: The dependent reference category is ‘No plan/action.’ The independent reference categories are: male; Under 30;
post-secondary education; inactive; more than 10 years in UK; does not have close relatives in the UK; single; does not
speak English at work; does not plan to apply for British citizenship anytime in the future; is not eligible for citizenship
now or within one year; does not have close relatives who are eligible for PRC; does not feel insecure about her rights;
does not feel ‘anxious’ about Brexit; prefers the UK to remain in the EU under the pre-referendum conditions or to
become even more integrated in the EU.
Model χ2 (63) = 236.097, p < .001. The model was rescaled for underdispersion based on the deviance statistic (φ = 0.67).
+p < .1.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
2122 D. MCGHEE ET AL.
citizenship – as opposed to not taking any action – as those aware of their immediate
ineligibility for citizenship. Again, these results highlight the relevance of rights-awareness,
and at the same time reveal one of the central effects of Brexit on Polish migrants’ strat-
egies, namely its emotionally ‘mobilising’ effect.
In a Brexit scenario, the outcome favourability of the EU Referendum still significantly
– albeit more weakly – determines plans to apply for PRC, but not other planned actions.
Lastly, while ‘rights insecurity’ loses its significance, feeling ‘anxious’ about Brexit emerges
as a highly significant determinant of post-Brexit migration strategies. As mentioned in
the previous section, this derived variable combines opinions regarding the likelihood
of a Brexit vote with opinions on what the personal effects of a Brexit would be (see
also Table A2 in the Appendix). We can therefore assume that those who had not only
thought that Brexit would have a negative effect on their lives, but also that it was some-
thing likely to occur (i.e. they felt ‘anxious’ about it) would have given more consideration
to their options and planned actions following Brexit. As shown in Table 3, those ‘anxious’
about Brexit were 3.2 times more likely to plan to leave the UK than to stay without taking
any action, and 2.5 times more likely to want to apply for either PRC or British citizenship
following a Brexit vote. It seems, therefore, that it is the combination of rights-awareness,
active consideration of one’s options, and the emotional stress caused by the EU Referen-
dum that most powerfully determines the migration strategies of Polish migrants in the
UK following the Brexit vote.
Discussion and conclusions
The above analysis allows us to draw several conclusions regarding the medium-term
plans and migration strategies of Polish nationals living in the UK, within the framework
of civic and mobility rights available to them and in relation to the UK’s prospective depar-
ture from the EU. As the descriptive results have shown, the overwhelming majority of our
respondents (72%) were aiming for civic integration over the next five years, thus tying
their legal status to UK law rather than relying solely on the constellation of rights pro-
vided by EU citizenship. We could also see that Brexit has little effect on this outcome
on the ‘aggregate’ level [cf. reference withheld].
The results from the bivariate analysis broadly indicate that Polish migrants in the UK
are not only a very diverse population in respect to socio-economic and demographic
characteristics (see Burrell 2010, 299), but that these characteristics play a less important
role in determining their future migration strategies under the terms discussed here. More
meaningful is their general attitude towards British citizenship and the UK, their configur-
ation of rights and knowledge thereof, and their exposure to the local cultural environment
(as partially and indirectly measured by the use of English at work). This finding is also
supported by the regression results: we could see that neither the length of residence
nor having close family members in the UK significantly determined one’s plans, but
awareness of one’s civic integration options (which largely depend on residence) or the
rights of family members do have a significant influence. To some extent, this finding cor-
responds with that of Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015, 17), who find that ‘it is not so
much the duration of their stay as such that affects migrants’ return intentions as their
level of socio-cultural integration’. While we do not have comparable measurements of
‘integration’ to include in our model, and we have reframed our analysis in terms of
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‘rights’ rather than the intended length of stay in the destination country, the underlying
message behind our findings shares obvious similarities.
The fact that those with a declared preference for the UK to leave the EU (or remain a
member only conditionally), were also more likely to have formulated clear plans for the
medium-term future rather than being ‘indeterminate’, was another interesting finding
which opens up to various interpretations. To understand the mechanisms behind this
association would require further qualitative research, but we can think of several plausible
hypotheses: one would be that already conceived plans of civic integration are the ones
that determine attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership, which may be shaped by
an assimilation of mainstreammajority attitudes, fears and insecurities about future immi-
gration, or other factors that played a role in determining the result of the Referendum
overall. This, however, would not explain mobility plans. Another possibility is the influ-
ence of general Euro-sceptic sentiments, and a further one could be, on the contrary, dis-
illusionment with life in the UK and support for Britain’s exit from the EU as a vindictive
attitude coupled with intensions to leave the UK within five years. Examining these
hypotheses, however, falls outside the scope of the present study.
In this paper, we were particularly interested in assessing the continued validity of
Polish migrants’ ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ (Drinkwater and Garapich 2015; Eade, Drink-
water, and Garapich 2007; Snel, Faber, and Engbersen 2015). Within the rights-based fra-
mework that we adopted, the habitus of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ is still relevant, yet it is
this opportunity to keep one’s ‘options deliberately open’ as EU citizens (Eade, Drink-
water, and Garapich 2007, 11) – which, from a rights-based perspective, could most
closely be described by a lack of plans to leave in the medium-term coupled with a lack
of intentions of civic integration – that is most jeopardised as a consequence of Brexit.
As our analysis has highlighted, the sense of insecurity regarding rights derived from
EU citizenship was significant in determining naturalisation intentions as opposed to
keeping options deliberately open in respect to civic integration. Unfortunately, our
research cannot determine whether such insecurities had existed at the time of migration,
or whether they were the consequence of the heated public debates on EU free movement
which have taken place over the past couple of years, or of the UK Government’s attempts
before the EU Referendum to secure the right to restrict certain entitlements held by EU
migrants. In either case, two-thirds of our respondents held such fears (see Table A1).
On the other hand, ‘Brexit anxiety’ was the main factor pushing Polish migrants away
from ‘indeterminacy’ and towards having to formulate more concrete plans for the future
in the eventuality of a Leave vote in the EU Referendum, whereas the simple fact of being
eligible for naturalisation was the strongest factor explaining preferences for British citizen-
ship. We have also seen that in case of Brexit those who had been in the UK for less than 5
years were more likely to apply for PRC than those who had been resident for longer than 10
years (while no other dimensions of length of stay proved significant in respect to ‘Brexit
actions’). This may reflect that those who have arrived to the UK more recently and may
not yet qualify for naturalisation, but at the same time would prefer to remain in the UK
for at least another five years, are drawn to permanent residence in greater numbers than
some of those who migrated more than a decade ago and, who in case of Brexit, would
rather opt for British citizenship or conclude that the time to leave Britain has come.
Based on our findings, therefore, it may be legitimate to ask whether one important effect
of Brexit is to engender an antithetical habitus of ‘undeliberate determinacy’.
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Following from the above discussion, the main argument that we put forward in this
paper is that the socio-economic and demographic variables which have emerged in quali-
tative research as significant in determining settlement or re-migration plans – such as
relationship status, children, length of stay or employment among others (Janta 2013;
McGhee, Travena, and Heath 2015; Ryan 2015; White 2011) – are not on their own sig-
nificant in determining the plans and strategies in respect to rights and options of civic
integration and mobility in the case of as diverse a migrant group as that of Polish
nationals in the UK. Rather, we argue that it is the additional elements of rights-awareness,
interest and social proximity to the available options of civic integration, as well as
anxieties and insecurities concerning supranationally derived rights, which carry more
weight in explaining both medium-term plans and actions under the circumstances
created by the UK’s vote to exit the EU.
This paper, nevertheless, opens up a series of questions that require separate in-depth
treatment and need further research. We have put forward a case for a sociologically situ-
ated ‘rights-based’ approach to examining migration strategies, which takes account of the
different constellation of rights that EU migrants possess or have access to, while at the
same time reflecting upon the subjective interpretation of their rights by migrants. In
taking forward such an approach, more qualitative research is needed in order to under-
stand the social–psychological mechanisms behind the subjective interpretation of one’s
rights and the related proactive decision-making processes. By reconceptualising ‘deliber-
ate indeterminacy’ and ‘civic integration’ within a temporally constrained rights-based
approach, the need to (re)theorise them became more evident. As acknowledged in the
introduction to our conceptual framework, civic integration could very well be employed
as a strategy to expand one’s options for remaining ‘indeterminate’ in the future, while
indeterminacy should not necessarily reflect temporariness. In other words, neither of
the two strategies may be signalling the ‘settlement’ or otherwise of Polish migrants,
but rather new legal-structural moorings for transnational living, for being able to lead
‘normal’ lives while ‘settled in mobility’ (Galasińska and Kozłowska 2009; Morokvasic
2004). This assumption is also supported by our findings indicating that insecurities
and anxieties about potentially losing currently possessed rights are driving forces
behind civic integration actions. Understanding such processes and the ways in which
the Brexit process will impact on Polish migrants’ future strategies, however, will
require a focused qualitative treatment.
Notes
1. See ‘Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003, 15(1), http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1003/pdfs/uksi_20061003_310515_en.pdf
2. See ‘The British Nationality (General) (Amendment No. 3) Regulations 2015’, http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1806/made.
3. As mentioned earlier, the category of those ‘indeterminate’ who already hold a PRC are only
presented here for descriptive purposes and will be excluded from statistical analyses.
4. Given the impressive size of this odds ratio it is worth noting that the lower bound of the 95%
confidence interval for Exp(B) was 44.250, and the upper bound was 252.895.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2125
Funding
This work was supported by Economic and Social Research Council [RES-625-25-0001].
ORCID
Derek McGhee http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3226-6300
Chris Moreh http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7739-1455
Athina Vlachantoni http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1539-3057
References
Anwar, Muhammad. 1979. The Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain. London: Heinemann
Educational.
Burrell, Kathy (ed.). 2009. Polish Migration to the UK in the ‘New’ European Union: After 2004.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Burrell, Kathy. 2010. “Staying, Returning, Working and Living: Key Themes in Current Academic
Research Undertaken in the UK on Migration Movements from Eastern Europe.” Social
Identities 16 (3): 297–308.
Couper, Mick. 2000. “Review: Web Surveys: A Review of Issues and Approaches.” Public Opinion
Quarterly 64 (4): 464–494.
Dekker, Rianne, and Godfried Engbersen. 2014. “How Social Media Transform Migrant Networks
and Facilitate Migration.” Global Networks 14 (4): 401–418.
Drinkwater, Stephen, and Michał P. Garapich. 2015. “Migration Strategies of Polish Migrants: Do
They Have Any at All?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41 (12): 1909–1931.
Eade, John, Stephen Drinkwater, and Michal Garapich. 2007. Class and Ethnicity – Polish Migrants in
London. Research Report for the RES-000-22-1294 ESRC Project. University of Surrey, CRNEM.
Favell, Adrian. 2008. “The New Face of East–West Migration in Europe.” Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 34 (5): 701–716.
Galasińska, Aleksandra, and Olga Kozłowska. 2009. “Discourses of a ‘Normal Life’ among Post-
accession Migrants from Poland to Britain.” In Polish Migration to the UK in the ‘New’
European Union: After 2004, edited by Kathy Burrell, 87–106. Farnham: Ashgate.
Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2012. “Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in
Western Europe.” World Politics 64 (4): 659–698.
de Haas, H., and T. Fokkema. 2011. “The Effects of Integration and Transnational Ties on
International Return Migration Intensions.” Demographic Research 25 (24): 755–782.
Heath, Sue, Derek McGhee, and Paulina Trevena. 2011. “Lost in Transnationalism: Unraveling the
Conceptualisation of Families and Personal Life through a Transnational Gaze.” Sociological
Research Online 16 (4), article no. 12. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/16/4/12.html.
Janta, Barbara. 2013. “Polish Migrants’ Reproductive Behaviour in the United Kingdom.” Studia
Migracyjne – Przeglad Polonijny 39 (3(149)): 63–96.
Joppke, Christian. 2007. “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in
Western Europe.” West European Politics 30 (1): 1–22.
Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social
Field Perspective on Society.” International Migration Review 38 (3): 1002–1039.
Lopez Rodriguez, Magdalena. 2010. “Migration and a Quest for ‘Normalcy’. Polish Migrant
Mothers and the Capitalization of Meritocratic Opportunities in the UK.” Social Identities 16
(3): 339–358.
Mau, Steffen, and Roland Verwiebe. 2014. European Societies: Mapping Structure and Change.
Bristol: Policy Press.
McGhee, Derek, Sue Heath, and Paulina Trevena. 2012. “Dignity, Happiness and Being Able to Live
a ‘Normal Life’ in the UK – An Examination of Post-accession Polish Migrants’ Transnational
Autobiographical Fields.” Social Identities 18 (6): 711–727.
2126 D. MCGHEE ET AL.
McGhee, Derek, Sue Heath, and Paulina Trevena. 2013. “Competing Obligations and the
Maintenance of Physical Co-presence: The Impact of Migration and Structural Constraints on
Post-accession Polish Families in the UK.” Families, Relationships and Societies 2 (2): 229–245.
McGhee, Derek, and Emilia Piętka-Nykaza. 2016. “From Privileged to Thwarted Stakeholders –
Polish Migrants’ Perceptions of the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 and the UK
General Election in 2015.” Citizenship Studies 20 (6–7): 899–913.
McGhee, Derek, Paulina Travena, and Sue Heath. 2015. “Social Relationships and Relationships in
Context: Post-accession Poles in Southampton.” Population, Space and Place 21 (5): 433–445.
Miller, Peter G., and Anders L. Sønderlund. 2010. “Using the Internet to Research Hidden
Populations of Illicit Drug Users: A Review.” Addiction 105 (9): 1557–1567.
Moreh, Chris. 2014. “A Decade of Membership: Hungarian Post-accession Mobility to the United
Kingdom.” Central and Eastern European Migration Review 3 (2): 79–104.
Morokvasic, Mirjana. 2004. “‘Settled in Mobility’: Engendering Post-wall Migration in Europe.”
Feminist Review 77 (1): 7–25.
Mouritsen, Per. 2013. “The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany,
Great Britain and Denmark.” Ethnicities 13 (1): 86–109.
ONS (Office for National Statistics). 2016. Population by Country of Birth and Nationality, 2015.
London: Office for National Statistics.
Parutis, Violetta. 2014. “Returning ‘Home’: East European Migrants’ Discourses of Return.”
International Migration 52 (5): 159–177.
Ryan, Louise. 2011. “Transnational Relations: Family Migration among Recent Polish Migrants in
London.” International Migration 49 (2): 80–103.
Ryan, Louise. 2015. ‘Another Year and Another Year’: Polish Migrants in London Extending the Stay
Over Time. Research Report. London: Middlesex University.
Snel, Erik, Marije Faber, and Godfried Engbersen. 2015. “To Stay or Return? Explaining Return
Intentions of Central and Eastern European Labour Migrants.” Central and Eastern European
Migration Review 4 (2): 5–24.
Stones, Rob. 2005. Structuration Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sue, Valerie M., and Lois A. Ritter. 2012. Conducting Online Surveys. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Temple, Elizabeth C., and Rhonda F. Brown. 2011. “A Comparison of Internet-based Participant
Recruitment Methods: Engaging the Hidden Population of Cannabis Users in Research.”
Journal of Research Practice 7 (2), article no. D2. http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/
view/288/254.
White, Anne. 2011. Polish Families and Migration Since EU Accession. Bristol: Policy Press.
White, Anne, and Louise Ryan. 2008. “Polish ‘Temporary’ Migration: The Formation and
Significance of Social Networks.” Europe-Asia Studies 60 (9): 1467–1502.
Wiener, Antje. 2013. “Towards Global Citizenship Practice?” In Citizenship and Security: The
Constitution of Political Being, edited by Xavier Guillaume, and Jef Huysmans, 75–94.
London: Routledge.
Appendix
Table A1. Bivariate statistics for 5-year plans by personal characteristics (row percentages and adjusted
standardised residuals in parentheses1).
Leave the UK
Remain in the UK and
NApply for PRC Apply for citizenship No plan
Sex: χ2 = 6.521 (3, N = 817), p = .089
Male 9.1 (2.2) 44.7 (0.7) 32.4 (−0.8) 13.8 (−1.4) 275
Female 5.2 (−2.2) 42.3 (−0.7) 35.1 (0.8) 17.5 (1.4) 542
Age: χ2 = 22.735 (9, N = 818), p = .007
<30 8.6 (1.1) 37.9 (−1.4) 30.7 (−0.9) 22.9 (2.3) 140
30–39 8.3 (1.9) 39.5 (−1.9) 36.8 (1.5) 15.5 (−0.7) 375
(Continued )
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Table A1. Continued.
Leave the UK
Remain in the UK and
NApply for PRC Apply for citizenship No plan
40–49 1.9 (−3.1) 48.6 (1.9) 35.2 (0.4) 14.3 (−1) 210
50< 6.5 (0) 52.7 (2) 25.8 (−1.8) 15.1 (−0.4) 93
Highest educational qualification: χ2 = 25.802 (6, N = 794), p = .000
Post-secondary higher 8.2 (2) 38 (−2.8) 41.1 (3.8) 12.7 (−2.4) 353
Secondary 3.7 (−2.5) 46.7 (1.6) 29.7 (−2.1) 19.8 (2.3) 323
Vocational 7.6 (0.6) 50.8 (1.8) 24.6 (−2.3) 16.9 (0.2) 118
Economic activity status: χ2 = 15.853 (9, N = 775), p = .070
In full-time employment 6.9 (0.5) 43.9 (1) 34 (−0.2) 15.2 (−1.5) 462
In part-time employment 4.6 (−1) 33.1 (−2.4) 41.5 (1.9) 20.8 (1.3) 130
Self-employed 9.2 (1) 53.9 (2.1) 23.7 (−2) 13.2 (−0.9) 76
Inactive 5.6 (−0.4) 39.3 (−0.7) 33.6 (−0.1) 21.5 (1.4) 107
Socio-economic status: χ2 = 33.186 (9, N = 563), p = .000
I + II 10 (1.3) 30 (−2.8) 54 (4.6) 6 (−3.1) 100
III + IV 4.5 (−1) 44.9 (0.5) 36 (0.4) 14.6 (−0.5) 89
V + VI 8.6 (1.1) 43.5 (0.4) 29.6 (−1.7) 18.3 (0.9) 186
VII 4.8 (−1.4) 46.8 (1.5) 27.7 (−2.3) 20.7 (2) 188
Time spent in the UK: χ2 = 8.45 (6, N = 817), p = .207
Less than 5 8 (1.1) 46 (1.2) 30.8 (−1.4) 15.2 (−0.5) 263
5–10 5.7 (−1) 43.8 (0.4) 33.2 (−0.6) 17.4 (0.9) 386
More than 10 6.5 (0) 36.3 (−2) 42.3 (2.4) 14.9 (−0.5) 168
Relationship status: χ2 = 11.199 (6, N = 799), p = .082
Single 8.9 (2) 44.6 (0.6) 33.3 (−0.5) 13.2 (−1.5) 258
Married/civil partnership 4.8 (−1.9) 44.7 (1) 33.3 (−0.8) 17.1 (0.9) 414
In long-term relationship 6.3 (0) 33.9 (−2.3) 41.7 (1.8) 18.1 (0.7) 127
Partner’s economic activity: χ2 = 6.676 (6, N = 767), p = .352
Single (respondent) 9 (2.1) 44.1 (0.5) 33.6 (−0.4) 13.3 (−1.5) 256
Employed 4.9 (−2.1) 42 (−0.6) 35.6 (0.7) 17.5 (1.3) 452
Inactive 6.8 (0.1) 44.1 (0.2) 32.2 (−0.4) 16.9 (0.2) 59
Children: χ2 = 8.800 (6, N = 805), p = .185
No children 8.7 (2.2) 41.7 (−0.4) 34.5 (0) 15 (−1) 333
All in UK 5.2 (−1.7) 42.2 (−0.2) 35.2 (0.4) 17.5 (0.8) 446
Some/all not in UK 0 (−1.4) 57.7 (1.6) 23.1 (−1.2) 19.2 (0.4) 26
Whether speaks English at work: χ2 = 29.873 (3, N = 799), p = .000
Yes 6.3 (0.1) 41.9 (−0.6) 38.7 (4.2) 13.1 (−4.7) 602
No 6.1 (−0.1) 44.2 (0.6) 22.3 (−4.2) 27.4 (4.7) 197
Whether planning British citizenship at any time in the future: χ2 = 239.766 (3, N = 817), p = .000
Yes 2.5 (−6.6) 38.9 (−3.4) 50.5 (13.8) 8 (−9) 550
No 14.6 (6.6) 51.3 (3.4) 1.5 (−13.8) 32.6 (9) 267
Whether eligible for British citizenship within one year: χ2 = 37.039 (6, N = 821), p = .000
Eligible 5 (−1.5) 38.3 (−2.6) 43.3 (5.2) 13.4 (−2.2) 397
Not eligible 9.1 (1.7) 46.9 (1.2) 30.9 (−1.1) 13.1 (−1.3) 175
Not know (the requirements) 6.4 (0.1) 47.4 (1.7) 22.9 (−4.6) 23.3 (3.6) 249
Whether has close relatives eligible for PRC within one year: χ2 = 40.279 (9, N = 787), p = .000
Yes 4.1 (−3.1) 45.1 (1) 38.1 (3) 12.8 (−3) 415
No 7.6 (0.3) 50.6 (1.4) 26.6 (−1.3) 15.2 (−0.3) 79
Does not know (the req.) 7.7 (0.5) 41.5 (−0.5) 21.5 (−3.1) 29.2 (4.3) 130
No close family 12.3 (3.2) 37.4 (−1.7) 33.7 (0.1) 16.6 (0) 163
Whether feels insecure about her rights: χ2 = 3.422 (3, N = 824), p = .331
Yes 5.8 (−1.2) 42.5 (−0.3) 36.1 (1.5) 15.6 (−0.7) 551
No 8.1 (1.2) 43.6 (0.3) 30.8 (−1.5) 17.6 (0.7) 273
Whether feels anxious about the possibility of Brexit: χ2 = 6.753 (3, N = 824), p = .080
Yes 5 (−1.6) 42 (−0.5) 38.3 (2.2) 14.8 (−1.1) 379
No 7.9 (1.6) 43.6 (0.5) 31 (−2.2) 17.5 (1.1) 445
Preference for the outcome of the EU Referendum: χ2 = 11.269 (3, N = 817), p = .010
Leave (or conditional stay) 5.6 (−1.1) 46.1 (1.9) 35.7 (1) 12.6 (−3) 414
Remain (and integrate further) 7.4 (1.1) 39.7 (−1.9) 32.5 (−1) 20.3 (3) 403
Notes: 1Generally, cells with standardised residuals greater than ±2.6 significantly contribute to the χ2 statistic at p < .01.
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Table A2. Survey questions and derived variables.
Survey questions Response options (R) Derived variables:
If the UK votes to leave the EU, what will your most likely
action be?
(1) Move to a non-EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship)
(2) Move to another EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship)
(3) Move to your country of origin/citizenship
(4) Remain in the UK and apply for a permanent residence certificate (for yourself and your
family, if applicable)
(5) Remain in the UK and apply for British citizenship (for yourself and your family, if
applicable)
(6) Remain in the UK without any concrete plan/take no action
Brexit action/5-year plan:
(1) Leave the UK (R = 1–3)
(1.1) Re-migration (R= 1–2)
(1.2) Return (R= 3)
(2) PRC (R= 4)
(3) Citizenship (R= 5)
(4) No plan/action (R= 6)
Regardless of the EU referendum, what is your most likely
plan for the next 5 years?
What language do you use most often at work (if applicable)? (1) My native language
(2) English (not my native language)
(3) Another language
(4) Not applicable
Speaking English in a work-place
environment:
(1) Yes (R = 2)
(2) All else
At any point in the future, are you planning to apply for
British citizenship?
(1) Yes
(2) No
Have you applied, or are you currently (or within one year
from now) eligible to apply for British citizenship?
(1) I have applied for British citizenship (Not included in the analysis)
(2) I am eligible to apply
(3) I am not eligible to apply
(4) Do not know (the eligibility requirements)
Eligibility for citizenship
(1) Eligible
(2) Does not know if eligible
(3) Not eligible
If applicable, are any of your close relatives (parents, children
or spouse) currently (or within one year from now) eligible
to apply for a permanent residence certificate?
(1) Yes
(2) No
(3) Do not know (if they are)
(4) Do not know (the eligibility requirements)
(5) Not applicable
Has close relatives who are
eligible for PRC
(1) Yes (R = 1)
(2) All else
How likely do you think it is that the below entitlements
currently enjoyed by EU citizens in the UK would become
limited in the future?
(a) Entry to the UK
(b) Long-term residence in the UK
(c) Rights granted to dependent family members
(d) Right to work
(e) Rights related to higher education
(f) Right to benefits related to employment and income
(Jobseeker’s Allowance; Income Support; Tax Credit;
Housing Benefit etc.)
(0) Do not know
(1) Very unlikely
(2) Somewhat unlikely
(3) There is an equal
probability
(4) Somewhat likely
(5) Very likely
Rights insecurity:
(1) Insecure (Any Likelihood (a)–
(i) R = 3–5 with same Affected
(a)–(i) R = 4–5)
(2) All else
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Table A2. Continued.
Survey questions Response options (R) Derived variables:
(g) Right to benefits related to family life (Child Benefit;
maternity/paternity pay and leave, etc.)
(h) Right to benefits related to health and disability (free
healthcare; Personal Independence Payment (PIP);
Disability Living Allowance (DLA); Invalid Carer’s
Allowance etc.)
(i) Right to benefits related to later life (UK state pension
etc.)
On a 1-to-5 scale where 1 is not at all and 5 is very much, how
much would you (or your family) be affected if any of
the below entitlements would become limited in the
future?
(0) Do not know
(1) Not at all
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) Very much
How likely do you think it is that the UK will leave the EU
after the Referendum?
(0) Do not know; (1) Very unlikely; (2) More unlikely; (3) There is an equal probability;
(4) More likely; (5) Very likely
Brexit anxiety:
(1) Anxious about Brexit
(Likelihood R = 3–5 with
Effect R = 1–2)
(2) All else
What effect would it have on your (and your family’s) life if
the UK chose to leave the EU?
(0) Do not know; (1) Very negative; (2) Somewhat negative; (3) None; (4) Somewhat
positive; (5) Very positive
Which one of the options below would you prefer? (1) The UK to leave the EU
(2) The UK to stay in the EU only if it gains more freedom to make its own laws
(3) The UK to stay in the EU under the current conditions
(4) The UK to stay and become even more integrated in the EU
Referendum outcome
preference:
(1) Leave (or conditional stay)
(2) Remain (and integrate
further)
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